This paper describes the origins and evolution of the term radical behaviorism. John B. Watson's coining ofbehaviorism in 1913 is presented first, followed by a discussion ofthe uses of"radical" within psychology during these early years. When the term radical behaviorism first emerged in the early 1920s, its referent was Watson's behaviorism, most specifically his stance on consciousness. In the 1930s, B. F. Skinner described his own position with the term radical behaviorism in an unpublished manuscript, and then in 1945 first referred in print to his views as such. Today, radical behaviorism is generally applied to Skinner's views alone. The paper concludes with a briefdiscussion ofa similarity in Watson's and Skinner's positions on consciousness, which seems a possible historical and philosophical connection between their respective radical behaviorisms.
Although the term radical behaviorism' today generally refers to the views of B. F. Skinner, its origins and historical evolution remain largely unexplored. Skinner, himself, seems to have been the first to use radical behaviorism in published reference to his views-in his 1945 paper on subjective terms (Skinner, 1945, p. 294 )-but the term had existed before then. Indeed, Skinner had used the term to describe his views in the 1930s, but in an unpublished manuscript; moreover, radical behaviorism was in use even prior to this. The purpose of this paper, then, is twofold -to describe the origins and historical evolution of the term radical This article was written while the first author was supported by a Graduate Honors Fellowship from the University of Kansas, and is based on a paper given at the 1986 meeting of the Association for Behavior Analysis, Milwaukee, WI. We would like to express our gratitude to the respondents to a letter of inquiry on the origins of the term radical behaviorism, in particular, A. C. Catania, S. R. Coleman, J. A. Dinsmoor, E. Hearst, T. J. Knapp, K. MacCorquodale, B. F. Skinner, and G. Zuriff. We also acknowledge helpful comments on earlier versions of the manuscript by S. R. Coleman, Lisa M. Johnson, Steven E. Larsen, Bryan D. Midgley, and James T. Todd. Reprints may be obtained from the first author, Department of Human Development, University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS 66045.
' When reference is made to a technical term qua term, it is italicized, unless it is given as a quote from another source (and therefore within quotation marks). Nontechnical terms are set off with quotation marks (see the Publication Manual ofthe American PsychologicalAssociation, 3rd ed., 1983). behaviorism and, in particular, to suggest how Skinner's views came to be so named.
As an etymological and historical exercise, we hope that what we present will be of interest in itself. But there is possibly another benefit: Our findings may clarify to some degree what it is to be a radical behaviorist, for by describing the origins ofradical behaviorism, we are also exploring the evolution of its meaning (cf. Mach, 1883 Mach, /1960 Skinner, 1931; see Marr, 1985) . This does not make our exercise essentially philosophical in nature -for it is not. Rather, we are simply suggesting that the meaning of the term radical behaviorism may be found, in part, in the historical evolution of its use or, more technically, among the variables that have come to control its emission (i.e., its being "tacted"; see Skinner, 1957, pp. 13-14) . This historical approach towards understanding scientific terminology may contribute to an appreciation of what behavior analysts and others mean when speaking of radical behaviorism.
Finally, we would like to comment briefly about the character ofthe material to follow. Our research was primarily archival in nature, and the raw data for our analysis are the written etymological and historical records of psychologists and philosophers who have come before us (see Parrott & Hake, 1983) . Just as do other researchers, we present our data for scrutiny by the scientific community, and 27 28 SUSAN M. SCHNEIDER & EDWARD K. MORRIS thus have included more quoted and footnoted material than is usual. In doing so, however, we provide readers with access to many of the variables that led us to our conclusions.
That said, let us turn to our task, first, by describing John B. Watson's coining ofbehaviorism, and second, by discussing the various uses of "radical" during the early years of behaviorism's development. Following that, we describe the emergence and evolution of radical behaviorism.
BEHA VIORISM
The term behaviorism as now used represents so many different points of view, and these will change sofrequently during the next decade that the word "behaviorism" will hardly survive. (Weiss, 1929, p. 147) Originally, there was just one behaviorism-Watson's, and Watson was apparently the first to use the term (and its variants) in print. He did so in his 1913 challenge to psychology, "Psychology as the Behaviorist Views It" (J. B. Watson, 1913b) . To quote from the classic introduction of Watson's (1913b) Although not entirely original, these recommendations were bolder and more farreaching than those of Watson's predecessors (Burnham, 1968; Harrell & Harrison, 1938, pp. 368-369, 373-375, 380; Leahey, 1980, pp. 287-295; Marx & Hillix, 1979, pp. 126-132) , and essentially established behaviorism as a system of psychology.
In 1914, Watson commented on his choice of words to describe his new psychology: "A few terms have been used in this discussion of behavior-such as behaviorist, behavioristic, behaviorism. ... it is admitted that these words sound somewhat barbaric on a first hearing" (p. 1). Later, Watson stated more clearly that he had coined these terms: "In these three publications [J. B. Watson, 1913a [J. B. Watson, , 1913b [J. B. Watson, , 1914 ] the terms 'behaviorism,' 'behavioristic,' and 'behaviorist' were first used" (J. B. Watson, 1927, p. 248) . That Watson coined the term behaviorism and its variants is also affirmed by his contemporaries (Boring, 1929, p. 582; Woodworth, 1924, p. 259 ) and by modem etymological sources (e.g., Finkenstaedt, Leisi, & Wolff, 1970 , p. 1370 .2 Moreover, our consultation ofdictionaries and psychological and philosophical works prior to 1913 did not turn up any previous use of the term. Warren (1914b, p. 11) suggested that Angell coined the term independently (see also Rucker, 1969, pp. 38-39) , but the first use we located by Angell (1913, p. 261 ) was accompanied by a citation to Watson's (1913b) paper.
Perhaps this new name, as well as Watson's energy and ability in disseminating behaviorism and applying it to practical concerns, helped it quickly to become an object of psychological, philosophical, and public discussion. Restricting ourselves to the first, psychologists certainly began discussing the perspective under its new name without delay. For example, as alluded to above, in the second issue of the Psychological Review after the one containing Watson's (1913b) behaviorist manifesto, Angell (1913, pp. 261, 264 ) cited Watson's article and used the term behaviorist; and in 1914, in the samejournal, both Bode (1914) and Warren (1914a) published articles using Watson's terminology. The new terms also appeared before long in journals such as the Psychological Bulletin (see, e.g., Wells, 1913) and the Journal ofPhilosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods (see, e.g., Melville, 1914, p. 357 (Jones, 1915, p. 469) Now comes Professor Bode, and accuses me of not being sufficiently and consistently radical.... According to him, Professor Lovejoy and myself both ruin our arguments at the outset by postulating a transcendent power ofthought. (Dunlap, 1916, p. 53) The close relationship offunctionalist psychology to biology, however, has led many of the more radical followers ofthis general viewpoint (as Pillsbury and W. McDougall) to renounce all mental or subjective terms in their definition of the science and to prefer the simple statement that Psychology is the science of behavior. (J. S. Moore, 1921, p. 29) The two most radical doctrines put forward by the behaviorist are, first, that consciousness does not exist, and second, that psychology should wholly abandon the introspective method. (Washburn, 1922, p. 89) The most radical of [animal psychologists, with an allusion to Watson] are for excluding altogether the study ofconsciousness. (Woodworth, 1922, pp. 29-30) Second, in its senses ofboth extreme and iconoclastic:
For Watson, however, behavior and consciousness were mutually exclusive, and to define psychology as the science of behavior meant making a radical departure and ruling out all introspection, all reference to consciousness, and, as he conceived, practically all of psychology as it had developed up to 1912. (Woodworth, 1931, p. 51) There have come down wolf-like on the psychological fold the already mentioned behaviourists. The most extreme of these would deny to man the power of observing his own consciousness at all; and on the radical ground that, in truth, no such consciousness is known to exist! (Spearman, 1937, p. 79) Third, in its general political sense, "radical" has often implied the far left (cf. Williams, 1976, pp. 209-211) . Correspondingly, during the early years of behaviorism, an analogy was occasionally drawn between the far left and "radical" views of consciousness and introspection (e.g., Jastrow, 1927, p. 175 for a reference to Watsonian radical behaviorism as "this extreme left wing of Behaviorism"; see also Pear, 1922, p. 231; Warden, Jenkins, & Warner, 1934, p. 3; the analogy to the far right, however, may also be found3). We might also note that radicalism itself was occasionally a subject matter for psychology in the early 1920s (e.g., Wolfe, 1921) , and discussions of it may have had some influence over the general use of "radical" in psychology.
That "radical" should come to be paired with behaviorism, then, is perhaps 3 "1... the left wing, made up of those who confine their attention to the introspection of their own mental states, 'experience subjectively regarded'; that keen and fighting band on the right, which refuses to truckle with 'consciousness' and considers only behavior" (Humphrey, 1929 , p. 59).
not surprising. "Radical" also became a modifier in other psychological terminology, such as radicalfunctionalism (J. S. Moore, 1921, p. 31) and radical positivism (D. L. Evans, 1924, p. 348) . A similar term-radical empiricism -which possibly influenced the use of "radical" in psychology, and the naming of radical behaviorism, originates from the field of philosophy.
Radical Empiricism
In the 1900s, William James introduced radical empiricism, which he himselfnamed (James, 1904b, p. 534; Runes, 1962, p. 90 ; see James, 1909, pp. xii-xiii for a briefsummary). Two features ofthis philosophical view were described in James's (1904a) article, "Does 'Consciousness' Exist?," which was reprinted as the first of James's Essays in Radical Empricism. One feature reflects James's stance on consciousness, which seems compatible with Watson's: A number of... authors seemed just on the point ofabandoning the notion ofconsciousness.... But they were not quite radical enough.... I mean only to deny that the word stands for an entity.... [ There is] no aboriginal stuffor quality of being contrasted with that of which material objects are made; but there is a function in experience which thoughts perform, and for the performance of which this quality ofbeing is invoked. (James, 1904a, pp. 477-478) A second and more central feature of James's radical empiricism is an expansion of these ontological views:
There is only one primal stuff or material in the world, a stuffof which everything is composed, and if we call that stuff 'pure experience,' then knowing can easily be explained as a particular sort of relation towards one another into which portions of pure experience may enter. (James, 1904a, p. 478) As this passage suggests, James's form of anti-dualism did not imply materialism (see also, e.g., Chakrabarti, 1975) , though Watson's did (see J. B. Watson, 1930, p. 3). As one commentator states, "It would be an inexcusable error to think ofJames as a behaviorist in the Watsonian sense of this term.... His radical empiricism stood in the way ofany such move" (Wild, 1969, p. 365 Is it not true that, as in the case ofour philosophies, there are behaviorisms and behaviorists? (Yerkes, 1917, p. 155) There was a time when the term 'behaviorism'in the title ofa speech required no further specification. Every psychologist at least knew the referent to be that new brand of psychology, introduced by Watson, which proposed to break with tradition and deny that psychology had anything to do either with a mentalistic entity called consciousness or a method known as introspection. Today the situation is not so simple. (Spence, 1948, p. 67) Yerkes could have pointed out to Spence that the situation was "not so simple" even in 1917, for the original behaviorism soon had rivals for its title. Watson had barely introduced behaviorism when others who did not outright accept or reject it wanted to alter it (Heidbreder, 1933, p. 260; see J. B. Watson, 1924, p . viii on "half-way behaviorists"), and modifiers were soon added to the term behaviorism in order to differentiate the varieties. Formal technical terms for precisely specified referents evolved and, in some cases, modifiers that seemed at first purely descriptive became part of formal terminology (e.g., "extreme" in 4Skinner has been referred to as a radical empiricist (Neel, 1977, p. 173; Spence, 1952, p. 153) , but the usage is ambiguous and, at such a distance from James, may not be referring to James's philosophy (but see Hillner, 1984, p. 169 for a possibly Jamesian use). extreme behaviorism, which, when formal, lost many of its negative connotations). In the first part of this section, we examine the use of some modifiers other than "radical" and "Watsonian." We then discuss the first published reference to radical behaviorism that we were able to locate (Calkins, 1921) . Finally, we trace the usage of the term for Watson's psychology from the 1920s through 1955. Watson himself, by the way, is not known to have used the term radical behaviorism, and in going through his writing, we did not come across it. (See, however, J. B. Watson, 1913a Watson, , p. 421, repeated in 1914 , for a use of "radical" in connection with his denial of imagery, and J. B. Watson, 1920, p. 54 , for a use of"radical" with reference to thinking as only a reflection of behavior.)
Other Termsfor Watsonian Behaviorism
As described in the last section, "radical" was a common descriptor for behavioristic ideas and, as might be expected, several ofthe synonyms ofradical given above -"extreme" and "thoroughgoing"-were also used in conjunction with behaviorism. Thoroughgoing behaviorism, however, occurred only infrequently, apparently beginning in 1921 (J. S. Moore, 1921, p. 33) .
"Extreme" was probably the most common adjective used in connection with behaviorism for many years, and may still be found today (e.g., Chaplin & Krawiec, 1979, p. 55; see Margolis, 1984, p. 34 for a reference to Skinner as an "extreme behaviorist"). Back in 1914, Sidis referred to Watson's "extreme view of the denial of introspection" (p. 44; see also Marvin, 1914, p. 3) . Then, in 1915, extreme behaviorists (MacIntosh, 1915, p. 277) and extreme behaviorism (Marvin, 1915, p. 14) appeared and began to be used. In general, the modifier was used to emphasize the differences between Watsonian (or close-to-Watsonian, e.g., Weissian) views and more traditional views. Usage was both descriptive and formal, a distinction that may be impossible to make. For instance, without adequate context, an author referring to "the extreme behaviorists" might mean (a) Watson and holders ofvery similar views, (b) a less specific group of psychologists and philosophers, or (c) the extremeness of the views of either group. In any case, other than radical behaviorism, extreme behaviorism was the term we found most often as the designation for Watson's psychology.
Of the other labels, strict behaviorism first appeared in the same article where radical behaviorism originated (strict behaviorism was used in a footnote in Calkins, 1921, p.4 , and then by Lashley, 1923 and Roback, 1923) , and occurred fairly often, relatively speaking, but apparently only in the twenties and very early thirties. Its formal use by McDougall (1926) in Psychologies of 1925 may have contributed to strict behaviorism's popularity during this period. Other modifiers for Watsonian or near-Watsonian behaviorism or behaviorists between 1912 and 1955 included "monistic" (Weiss, 1919, p. 327), "orthodox" (Wieman, 1919, p. 241), "parallelistic" (Kantor, 1921, p. 231), "pure" (Gregory, 1922, p. 586), "ideal" (Weiss, 1924, p. 48), "metaphysical" (Brightman, 1930, p. 309), "negative" (Dotterer, 1933, p. 198) , "classical" (Heidbreder, 1933, p. 276), "physiological" (Pepper, 1934, p. 110), and "rigid" (Young, 1943, p. 27) . Two further designations were "behaviorist of the severe type" (Young, 1924, p. 292) and "ultra-behaviorists" (Garrison, 1930, p. 163) . All ofthese terms, however, seem to have been used infrequently.
We might point out that so many modifiers were available that authors sometimes switched from one to another, even in the same work. A good example ofthis is Roback's (1923) use of four different terms: "behaviorism in its extreme form" (p. 138), "orthodox behaviorism" (p. 187), "thoroughgoing behaviorist" (p. 217), and "strict behaviorists" (p. 271).
Radical Behaviorism
The first apparent use of radical behaviorism in print is, interestingly, largely formal. (Calkins, 1921, p. 1; see also p. 4). Calkins, who had earlier spoken of her "radical disagreement with Watson's main thesis" (1913, p. 289), went on to describe Watson as "the most prominent upholder of radically behavioristic psychology" (1921, p. 2), and then introduced the terms radical behaviorists (p. 4) and radical behaviorism (p. 5). As mentioned, strict behaviorism was used once in this article in a footnote (p. 4). Although Calkins did not make consistent use of radical behaviorism thereafter (e.g., she did not use it in Calkins, 1930) , the term she apparently originated was soon accepted within psychology.5
Not surprisingly, most of the other occurrences of radical behaviorism during the 1920S6 were also in the Psychological I The type of enterprise to which radical behaviorism refers, however, has not always been clear. In Watson's time, behaviorism (i.e., his radical behaviorism) was considered, singly or in various combinations, a program, science, method, and/or philosophy (see, e.g., Brightman, 1930, p. 309; Burnham & Wheelwright, 1932, p. 328; Calverton, 1924, pp. 422-423; Rall, 1930, pp. 290-291; Woodworth, 1924, p. 260 Jastrow's (1927) argument against radical behaviorism shows that the original reactions to and descriptions of behaviorism were still very much current. Jastrow spoke of "the tilting by the radical behaviorists against the windmills of consciousness" (p. 173).
In the 1930s, the denial or ignoring of consciousness was still seen as the main feature ofradical behaviorism (e.g., Carr, 1930, p. 77; McDougall, 1930, p. 42) . Although fewer articles were written concerning Watson during this period, compared to the 1920s (Logue, 1985, p. 178; R. I. Watson, 1976) , nearly as many citations using radical behaviorism (or its variants) can be listed; thus, perhaps radical behaviorism had more clearly become an established formal term. For example, whereas Roback had not used the term in 1923, he did in his second antibehaviorism book (1937, pp. 150, 152).8 ofinterest. In addition, where pertinent, entirejournal volumes and books were examined. The total search for information on Watsonian radical behaviorism (and also on early Skinnerian radical behaviorism) covered the period 1912-1955; however, because the subject was discussed less frequently over time, the years after the early 1930s were checked less thoroughly.
7 It is, ofcourse, possible that Warren coined the term independently. If the quick manuscript turnaround time of 1913 (see description ofAngell [1913] in the section on behaviorism) is any guide, however, Warren, whose article was published in November, might reasonably have seen the Calkins article (January issue) before final changes had been made in his manuscript.
8 Roback (1937, p. 197 ) also cites a doctoral dissertation on the history of radical behaviorism (Diehl, 1932- (Skinner, 1976, pp. 298-301; 1979, pp.4, 115) . He began using the term radical behaviorism as well.
SKINNERIAN RADICAL
BEHA VIORISM
[Skinnerian] radical behavioristphilosophy as explicit, extant doctrine can reasonably be timedfrom Skinner's 1945 paper, " The operational analysis of psychological terms. " It was this extraordinary work that put the "radical" in radical behaviorism. (Marr, 1984, p. 356) In Skinner's 1945 paper mentioned by Marr above, not only did Skinner first discuss philosophical matters in any depth, but he first referred in print to his philosophy as "radical" behaviorism (Skinner, 1945, p. 294)-apparently the first time anyone had done so. In this section, we trace the use of the term for Skinner's views.
As a postgraduate at Harvard in the early 1930s, Skinner was "at work on something called A Sketch for an Epistemology" (Skinner, 1979, p. 15) . In this Sketch, Skinner made a not uncommon distinction between what he called "radical behaviorism" (his own view) and "methodological behaviorism" (see Day, 1983; J. Moore, 1981) . Why did Skinner use the term radical behaviorism in this manner in the Sketch? In response to our inquiry concerning his early usage of the term, Skinner stated, "I don't believe I invented the phrase 'radical behaviorism.' I think it was in the air at the time" (personal communication, January 31, 1985) . Clearly, in the early 1930s, the term was still current for Watson's views, and Skinner had, perhaps, come across it in his contacts with the philosophy and psychology of the time (see Coleman, 1985 , for some of these). Further, Skinner's depiction ofradical behaviorism is, in some respects, in accord with Watson's philosophical views, as is suggested in the last major section of our paper, as well as in what follows.
In the Sketch, methodological behaviorism was described as a position that distinguishes between the scientifically amenable public and the scientifically untreatable private. Many behaviorists since Watson, and even some presentday psychologists who might not call themselves behaviorists, could be considered to be behaviorists ofthis sort (see Brunswik, 1952, p. 66-67; Day, 1980, p. 241; Leahey, 1984, pp. 131-132; Marx & Hillix, 1979, p. 160) . But, as Skinner stated in his autobiography, occasionally quoting from the Sketch, "I preferred the position of radical behaviorism, in which the existence of subjective entities is denied. I proposed to regard subjective terms 'as verbal constructs, as grammatical traps into which the human race in the development of language has fallen'" (Skinner, 1979, p. 117) . This view of subjective terms is similar to one presented by Watson in Behaviorism (1930, P. 10).
These points in the Sketch are expanded in Skinner's 1945 paper, where his first published use of radical behaviorism (p. 294) occurs in connection with another discussion of the distinction between methodological and radical behaviorism. Also reminiscent of topics discussed in the Sketch, Skinner (1945) wrote that early behaviorism did not fulfill its potential because "it never finished an acceptable formulation of the 'verbal report.'19' The conception ofbehavior which [early behaviorism] developed could not convincingly embrace the 'use of subjective terms' " (p. 271). Skinner's paper is largely an analysis of how a verbal community might teach its members to use subjective terms in describing their private events (e.g., toothaches).
Given these correspondences in coverage between the Sketch and the 1945 paper, it seems quite possible that Skinner might have used the term radical behaviorism in his 1945 paper due to the influence ofthe Sketch on the manuscript that eventually became Verbal Behavior (Skinner, 1957) , for earlier versions of this latter manuscript were the source for the 1945 paper (Skinner, 1979, p. 294; 1983, p. 395) . Two other possible influences on Skinner's choice ofterm in 1945 can also be provided. First, in The Behavior ofOrganisms, Skinner cited (1938, p. 35 ) a paper that used the term radical behavioristic psychology (Kantor, 1933, p. 330) . And second, Pratt (1945, p. 263) mentioned "radical behaviorists" (prob- ably Watsonian, but his use is ambiguous) in his paper for the same special issue of the Psychological Review on operationism for which Skinner's paper was written. The contributors' papers were circulated prior to publication so that follow-up comments could be included (Langfeld, 1945, p. 241; Skinner, 1979, p. 295) . Skinner thus had an opportunity to see Pratt's paper, and we might note that Skinner used the term radical behaviorism only in his follow-up section.'0 As we have seen, not only did Skinner first refer in print in 1945 to his philosophy as radical behaviorism, but he also described one ofthe most important and unique features ofthat philosophy for the first time-its treatment ofprivate events (Day, 1983, p. 94; Marr, 1984, p. 356; Michael, 1985, p. 117). Skinner's treatments of the related areas of conscious-10 The term radical operationists was used in one of the questions on operationism that were circulated to the contributors beforehand in order to focus their discussions (Langfeld, 1945, p. 242 Fifty" (1963, p. 951; or see 1964, p. 80; see also p. 106)."
Returning to the general chronology of usage, from about 1940 to about 1960, radical behaviorism was being used infrequently by others to refer to Watson, as we have seen, or to Skinner. Skinnerian psychology, itself, was typically given other labels during this period,'2 one of the most common of which was descriptive behaviorism (esp. Hilgard, 1948, p. 116; '3 also, e.g., Marx, 1951, p. 439; Munn, 1950, p. 364; Stolurow, 1953, p. 77 Epstein (1982) and Knapp (1974) were used in conducting the seach of Skinner's works. 12 See, however, Scriven (1956, p. (1948, p. 135) .
14 Skinner has also had some doubts about the term behaviorism, due to its connection with the denial of genetic differences falsely attributed to Watson (Skinner, 1979, p. 331; cf. R. I. Evans, 1968 cf. R. I. Evans, /1981 but to a lesser extent, in the general psychological and philosophical literature (e.g., Fodor, 1981, pp. 114-116; Kaufman, 1967, p. 272; Mackintosh, 1983, p. 56) .
FROM WATSON TO SKINNER [Skinnerian] radical behaviorism is the direct intellectual heir of classical Watsonian behaviorism. (Hillner, 1984, p. 168; see also Buss, 1979, p. 12; Leahey, 1984, p. 132; Wolman, 1981, p. 137) To whatever extent the quotation above is true, it is fitting that, after Watson, Skinner should "inherit" the title of radical behaviorist and become its chief proponent. Although their philosophical and scientific perspectives differ in important ways (see Leahey, 1980, chaps. 10, 11, 12; Marx & Hillix, 1979, chaps. 6, 10; Skinner, 1974, e.g., pp. 244-245) Most historians agree that Watson became, at some point, a "strict behaviorist" in Lashley's sense (e.g., Harrell & Harrison, 1938, pp. 374-375; Leahey, 1984, p. 131; Marx & Hillix, 1979, p. 138), and that he proposed naturalistic processes to explain the phenomena described as "conscious" (e.g., subvocal thought, as in J. B. Watson, 1930, chaps. 10, 11; see also Lashley, 1923, pp. 244-245) . These views resemble Skinner's in some ways, although, again, the details ofthe two theories are very different (e.g., we leave discussion of issues such as intersubjective verifiability to others).
As for Skinner's position on consciousness, his own writings are the best source (e.g., Skinner, 1957, chaps. 5, 19; 1964; 1974, chaps. 1, 2, 14; 1980, p. 201) . The following can serve as a brief summary of his views, in which we see some similarities to Watson's views.'7 What one observes and talks about is always the 'real' or 'physical' world (or at least the 'one' world) and ... 'experience' is a derived construct to be understood only through an analysis ofverbal (not, of course, merely vocal) processes. (Skinner, 1945, p. 293) A science ofbehavior must consider the place ofprivate stimuli as physical things, and in doing so it provides an alternative account ofmental life. The question, then is this: What is inside the skin, and how do we know about it? The answer is, I believe, the heart ofradical behaviorism. (Skinner, 1974, p. 
233)
Ironically, however, radical behaviorists could deal with descriptions of private events, with the provision that the descriptions were inaccurate and perhaps never to be trusted, and that the events described were physical. (Skinner, 1979, p. 295) I had heard it said that my 1945 paper on how we learn to talk about private events had brought sensations back into behaviorism, but I was not preserving consciousness in any form. (Skinner, 1983, p. 279) Zuriff(1 984) provides further perspective: "What distinguishes Skinner from ... other behaviorists is not his legitimization of private events but the fact that he provides the most coherent account of how these events come to function as stimuli for verbal behavior" (p. 572). In any case, to whatever extent that Skinner's and Watson's later positions on consciousness share some points of similarity, they have been distinguished, at least, from methodological behaviorism. 17 We also see in these quotations some of Skinner's views on materialism (which are not unequivocal-see, e.g., 1964, p. 79; 1969, p. 248; 1979, p. 117 ; for commentary, see Marr, 1985, p. 
CONCLUSION
Currently, radical behaviorism is the established formal designation for B. F. Skinner's philosophy ofthe science ofbehavior. The term, however, originated in reference to the views ofJohn B. Watson, most likely because Watson's metaphysical position on controversial matters such as the nature of consciousness was considered extreme and iconoclastic. In becoming a formal term, radical behaviorism lost many of the negative connotations of those two descriptors, so that today the term carries a generally more neutral meaning (or in some cases more positive; see, e.g., Michael, 1985 , pp. 100-101 on "radical" meaning "thoroughgoing").
Although Watson himself never seemed to have used the term, Skinner was apparently the first to apply "radical" to his own behaviorism, perhaps simply as an accepted and appropriate formal term for views bearing some resemblance to his own. In particular, Skinner shares with Watson the view that consciousness is a nonexistent entity, but that the events labeled "conscious" are, in principle, amenable to scientific analysis. This latter feature of Watson's and Skinner's views-"radical" or not-can be considered important in setting their respective radical behaviorisms apart from methodological behaviorism.
